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BOOK REVIEWS 503 
Praise and Blame: Moral Realism and Its Applications, by Daniel L. Robinson. 
Princeton University Press, 2002. Pp. xi + 225. $29.95 (paper). 
PETER BYRNE, King's College London 
This is a very clearly written, highly readable study of the objective basis of 
moral praise and blame. It will be of some interest to students of philoso-
phy of religion. 
The argument of the book can be briefly summarized as follows. In 
chapter one conditions are set down for praise and blame to be effective as 
forms of punishment and reward for actions. Praise and blame must be 
based on correct, objective ascriptions of moral qualities to acts. The quali-
ties invoked must be relevant to praise and blame and be acknowledged as 
such. The source of praise and blame must have appropriate authority. 
There must be shared moral understandings in a community in which 
praise and blame takes place. 
These conditions set the course for the rest of the book. Chapter 1 pro-
ceeds to argue for moral realism, so that the first condition can be met. 
Chapters 2 and 3 deal in claims stemming from the notion of moral luck. 
The targets here include forms of determinism (an incompatibilist account 
of freedom is defended). They also include contentions to the effect that cir-
cumstances rather than an agent's own character playa greater role in pro-
ducing praise- or blameworthy conduct. There is considerable discussion 
of the likes of Williams and Nagel on moral luck. Chapter 4 targets psycho-
analytic and other scientific accounts of mind in so far as they are present-
ed as undermining the contention that we are, at least much of the time, 
responsible for our actions. Chapter 5 deals with the nature of punishment 
and forgiveness (recall: praise and blame are linked by Robinson to reward 
and punishment). The account of punishment here is non-utilitarian. 
Punishment under just law latches on to the real moral properties distorted 
or destroyed by unlawful conduct with a view to restoring the balance of 
justice thus disturbed. 
What is one to say about the treatment of these manifold issues by 
Robinson? Those who accept a traditional objectivist view of morals and a 
libertarian view of the moral agent will find the book comforting and its 
eloquence agreeable. From such a standpoint, it will be found to contain a 
fund of common sense applied to manifold problems about the nature of 
morality and moral agency. But it must be stated that there is a certain 
superficiality about the treatment of the issues on which the author com-
ments. In part this is due to the brevity with which they are treated in a 
study of such wide scope. For example, the huge topic of moral realism 
versus forms of subjectivism and projectionism contains much too much 
for Robinson's arguments on the matter to appear decisive. Similar things 
can be said about his treatment of free will and responsibility. Chapter 2 
notes the case against liberty of indifference conceptions of these notions 
which stems from the recent assault on the principle of alternate possibili-
ties mounted by Frankfurt and his able supporters such as John Martin 
Fischer. The conclusion (on p.74) of the discussion appears to be the some-
what lame "There is ample room for conviction on both sides of the 
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Frankfurt line". The types of arguments Robinson offers for free will, such 
as we have free will because the mind has selective powers of attention to 
particulars (98) and that determinism is self-refuting because it asks us to 
choose an intellectual position on the basis of argument (100), hardly seem 
compelling. 
Robinson is undoubtedly on the side of the angels (as I count them) but 
his study lacks philosophical depth. A final illustration of this point may be 
given. Chapter 5 turns on p. 196 to the topic of forgiveness and moral 
responsibility. The discussion has little direct bearing on topics in the phi-
losophy of religion; the implications of what is contended for thoughts 
about divine forgiveness are simply not spelled out (that is not a criticism). 
Philosophers of religion might nonetheless hope to find something sub-
stantive on the question of whether forgiveness of wrong done requires 
repentance and atonement. On p.199 we are told, with very little surround-
ing argument, that "Forgiveness requires atonement on the part of the 
offender". This looks like mere assertion, but it is an assertion which is 
deeply controversial given recent debates on the conceptual analysis of for-
giveness. It appears to rule out at a stroke the notion of unconditional for-
giveness. Yet we can find good arguments in the literature for the belief 
that wrongdoers can and should be forgiven in the absence of either repen-
tance and atonement, and without forgiveness necessarily collapsing into 
condoning (see, for example, E. Garrard and D. McNaughton "In defence 
of unconditional forgiveness", Proceedings of the Aristotlelian Society, vol. 
103, 2003, pp. 39-60). 
Thinking Through Rituals: Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Kevin 
Schilbrack. New York and London: Routledge, 2004. Pp. x + 278. $90.00 
(cloth), $25.95 (paper). 
JAMES BEILBY, Bethel University 
The resurgence in philosophy of religion in the last forty years has been 
well documented. But this increasing willingness on the part of philoso-
phers to take seriously religious concepts and practices has not raised all 
boats equally. The study of religious rituals as well as their nonreligious 
counterparts has been largely ignored by the philosophical community. 
This edited volume sets out to repair that deficiency. 
In the introduction, the editor, Kevin Schilbrack, provides a relatively 
comprehensive review of the various philosophical resources available for 
the study of rituals. His central contention is that "there are rich and exten-
sive philosophical resources with which one might build bridges between 
ritual and thought, between practice and belief, and between body and 
mind" (1). Schilbrack considers the following philosophical approaches or 
'schools of thought': pragmatism, post-Wittgensteinian linguistic philoso-
phy (including Searle's speech act theory), existentialism, hermeneutic phi-
losophy (especially Ricoeur's), Foucault's genealogical method, phenome-
nology (especially Merleau-Ponty's), cognitive science, feminist philoso-
